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Abstract 
Awards are widespread in all countries and are prevalent both in the public sphere and in the 
private sector. This paper argues, and empirically supports, that awards serve public functions 
and economists should take them seriously. Using a unique cross-country data set, we suggest 
that awards serve as signals. Awards are more prevalent the more difficult the position and 
status of an individual is to observe due to an anonymous and globalized setting. 
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Awards are a well-known feature in all societies throughout all times. They originated in 
monarchic societies as royal orders and titles; for example, in the United Kingdom, they first 
appeared in the form of an appointment as “Knight” or “Lord.” Republics also present orders 
such as France’s “Légion d’Honneur” or the United States’ “Presidential Medal of Freedom” 
and “Congressional Gold Medal.” Not-for-profit organizations, such as universities and 
scientific associations, also extensively use awards, examples being Nobel Prizes, the Fields 
Medal in mathematics, and the many awards given in sports, the media, and culture. Awards 
have also become important in for-profit enterprises. Companies honor their employees as 
“Employee of the Month” or with “Thanks! Awards” and companies are continuously 
creating new awards. 
Almost 40 years ago, Hansen and Weisbrod (1972) suggested that an economics award 
should be created, but they associated it exclusively with an award in the economics 
profession. Nevertheless, economists have largely disregarded awards because economists 
focus their attention primarily on monetary rewards as their incentive.3 Therefore, the 
economics profession still has little understanding of the function of awards in the public 
sphere despite their prevalence. 
Elsewhere, it is shown that awards induce individuals to act in the interest of the award giver 
(Frey and Neckermann 2008; Kosfeld and Neckermann 2010) and also affect the subsequent 
behavior of award winners (Neckermann, Cueni, and Frey 2009). The goal of this paper is to 
study whether awards fulfill an important societal function by reducing transaction costs. The 
question posed is—do awards function as signals of otherwise unobservable individual 
characteristics such as passion and dedication, team spirit, ability, and past successes? We 
can answer this question by studying whether the use of awards is more prominent when the 
particular characteristics or behavior of an individual is difficult to observe. We suggest a 
number of context factors that should influence the value of awards as signals, thereby 
affecting the average number of awards given per person across countries. These 
relationships should hold in case awards actually do have a signaling function. We expect 
                                                 
3 There are some analyses of specific prizes in the cultural sector, for example, the Queen Elizabeth Piano 
Competition (Ginsburgh and van Ours 2003; Glejser and Heyndels 2001) or in academia such as the best paper 
prizes in economics (Coupé 2005). However, these studies do not analyze the functions of awards but rather 
focus on the accuracy of expert opinions in selecting the best candidates as prize winners. 
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that, in countries with a high degree of anonymity and international exposure, individuals 
need to rely on signals to communicate talent and motivation in a credible manner. Therefore, 
the expectation is that such countries present a high number of awards. This paper does not 
analyze the effects that particular “cultures,” however defined, might have on awards. 
Instead, we use a rational choice approach and focus on the function of awards as a particular 
type of signal. 
An empirical analysis of such propositions was impossible up to now because no data existed 
on the prevalence of awards for a large number of countries. To overcome the lack of data, 
we constructed a unique data set using a representative sample of 3,630 individuals from the 
International Who’s Who (IWW) (Neal 2006). In addition to individual-specific 
characteristics, such as age and career, the IWW provides information on the entrants’ honors 
and awards. The results of the econometric analysis are consistent with the theoretical 
propositions. 
Economics has an extensive literature on signaling to overcome asymmetric information, 
which may result in market equilibria that fail to be Pareto optimal (Spence 1973,1974). The 
basic idea is that signals allow informed individuals to reveal information about their 
unobservable types through observable actions, actions that individuals of another type do not 
want to imitate. One prominent example is education that has signal value if the cost of an 
education is lower for high productivity types and if this, in turn, results in high productivity 
workers getting more education in equilibrium than low productivity workers. Signals are 
only informative in a separating equilibrium because this allows the high ability individuals 
to “prove” their type. Signals serve to coordinate expectations and roles and to reduce 
transaction costs. 
Awards reward behavior that is desirable, worthy of esteem, and that typically goes beyond 
the scope of “normal duty.” Hence, awards signal to others that the award recipient engaged 
in such behavior, thus the award. Similarly, uninformed parties can view awards as signals of 
unobservable individual characteristics, like dedication and motivation. In fact, awards have 
been explicitly shown to be signals of expertise (Heppner and Steve 1977). Awards given, for 
example, by the monarch or president of a country provide information to both insiders and 
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the public that the recipients have acted in a desirable way, and the awards establish the 
recipients as “good citizens.” Furthermore, motivation and certain abilities may only become 
apparent during the course of economic and social activities. In such situations, awards by 
informed parties are valuable signals. 
In general, signals are useful in situations where outsiders cannot directly observe behavior, 
but they do have access to information on awards as a coarse measure of an agent’s 
performance (for a similar argument on why the provision of plaques can increase donations, 
see Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009; Andreoni and Petrie 2004). Outsiders acquire this 
information because of the publicity associated with awards. The presentation of an award is 
frequently part of a formal ceremony in front of an audience. In addition, the press often 
reports who award recipients are, and official government publications commonly list this 
information. In the case of firms, companies post the information on the intranet or in a 
company newsletter. Recipients are encouraged to display the award or to wear the associated 
badge. In addition, recipients of awards often list their awards in their CVs and some include 
them as titles on their business cards. This feature sets awards apart from other rewards like 
praise or money that do not receive the same publicity and that are not associated with a 
sustainable visible symbol. 
Hence, the signaling literature provides one rationale for the prevalence and desirability of 
awards. People are willing to exert extra effort to obtain an award in order to reap the benefits 
in terms of recognition by other persons as well as to facilitate job offers, wage increases, and 
access to highly valued social networks. Award givers have an incentive to provide awards 
because they induce effort and bring publicity. 
In the case of companies, one might argue that they have no interest in installing award 
systems that increase the outside options of their employees and likely result in demands for 
higher wages. This argument is parallel to the one that firms should not invest in the general 
human capital of their employees because this augments the worker’s productivity in the 
same way in multiple firms so that the employee reaps the whole rent of the investment 
(Becker 1962; Parsons 1972; Hashimoto 1981). Investments in general human capital are 
rationalized with market imperfections that render the benefit of the investment larger within 
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the company than what the employee can market outside the company. Examples include 
asymmetric information (Katz and Ziderman 1990) and wage compression (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998,1999). The same arguments hold for awards when outside parties can infer the 
employee productivity increase induced by the award less well than can insiders. 
Section I discusses the data. Section II develops the theoretical hypotheses, and Section III 
reports the results of the econometric analysis. Section IV concludes. 
I. Data on Awards 
 
To empirically address awards as signals, we constructed a unique data set using the IWW 
(Neal 2006), a reference work comprising the most important people in 212 countries. The 
data source provides information on specific characteristics such as nationality, job, age, and 
international mobility, as well as on the number and kinds of awards each person received. 
We selected a subsample of 82 countries according to the availability of the basic country-
specific variables necessary for the statistical analysis.4 For these 82 countries, we took a 
random sample of 50 persons per country. When there were less than 50 entries, we coded all 
the available entries. With respect to awards, we collected the following information when 
available: 
? Source of the award (country of origin, foreign country, or international-like 
organization) 
? Award-giving institution (state, private organization, nonprofit organization, 
university, media) 
? Category in which the prize was awarded (social welfare, military, science, 
culture/art, sports, media, business, religion) 
? Type of award (order, medal, prize, title, grant, membership/fellowship) 
? Whether the award was accompanied by a monetary bonus 
Using the information from many different sources including the Internet, we constructed 
aggregate award data such as the number of awards per person. 
                                                 
4 See the appendix for a more detailed description and discussion of the data. We could not test sample selection 
due to the unavailability of data for countries not in the sample. However, the 82 countries in the sample 
represent a large set of countries for a cross-country analysis. 
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In the IWW, invitees provide the award information themselves. The IWW editorial team and 
their freelance researchers investigate and write the biographical entries for the persons 
selected for inclusion. Individuals listed in the IWW receive annual update forms where they 
can update and amend their information in any way necessary. All entries in the IWW follow 
an editorial process to verify the accuracy of the information. We assumed that respondents 
only indicated those awards that they considered noteworthy. Hence, award quality is 
somewhat endogenously controlled. Using the IWW as a source of data, we captured the 
prominent persons in each country. The awards of prominent persons, especially those listed, 
are of national or international significance. This allowed us to make the number of awards 
more comparable across countries. However, it also made it harder for us to detect any 
significant effect because the hypotheses pertain to the average individual in a country and 
prominent persons are often more internationally orientated and less affected by home-
country characteristics. 
The information on the number of awards per individual as well as per country as captured in 
the IWW database represents an interaction of award demand and supply in that country as 
well as an endogenous correction for award quality (demand side). The setup is as follows. 
The number of awards yi* person i has in country j is a function f of Xij, where Xij is a vector 
of country- and individual-specific factors. The number of awards y person yi indicates in the 
IWW is a function g of the number of awards the person actually has (yi*). Hence, 
* ( )i ijy f X=  (1) 
and 
( *( ), ).i iy g y x X=  (2) 
In our view, this approach, using yi as the variable of interest, is as close as one can currently 
get when measuring the intensity of usage and importance of awards across many countries. 
Nevertheless, the data collected from the IWW have several specific features that we need to 
consider carefully before a reasonable econometric estimate can be undertaken. 
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Although individual awards vastly differ, we can nevertheless aggregate them into different 
broad categories assuming that, on average, the number of awards in the respective award 
category reacts to the hypothesis under consideration. Moreover, an aggregation of awards is 
warranted because all awards share certain essential features. Examples of such features are 
the publicity and visibility of awards, the social recognition they bring, and the typically 
broad set of evaluation criteria with a subjective element. It is worth mentioning that awards 
do not fall under the purview of the law. A nonrecipient cannot claim an award by trying to 
establish that its performance was worthy of an award. In many countries, state orders are, for 
instance, one of the only areas of governmental acts that are not subject to administrative law. 
Using the above-mentioned data, the average number of personal awards in each country was 
calculated. Included were all awards listed in the IWW section “honors and awards,” as well 
as those prizes and awards listed in the sections “career” and “works” and honorific titles 
mentioned next to the name of the person. We counted memberships and fellowships only 
when the IWW listed them in the “honors or awards” section or explicitly reported them as 
being honorary. We excluded golden, silver, and platinum records from the analysis because 
they do not represent awards but directly reflect sales success. For the same reason, we 
excluded gold, silver, and bronze medals in sports competitions. The latter lack several of the 
defining characteristics of awards such as the broad performance criteria and subjective 
performance evaluations (with the exception of some sports like dancing). The number of 
awards per individual lies in the interval [0, 99] and has a mean of 2.8 and a standard 
deviation of 5.5. 
To provide a visual of the data, Table 1 displays the average numbers of awards for the top 
10 countries as well as for five other selected countries. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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II. Factors Affecting Award Effectiveness 
 
Anonymity 
Signals about individual characteristics tend to be of more importance in more anonymous 
settings. Hence, we expect a larger number of awards in countries with higher degrees of 
anonymity of social interactions within the country. 
The general relationship predicted between awards as signals and anonymous social 
relationships leads to two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis A: The number of awards in a country increases depending on the degree of a 
country’s urbanization. 
We used the percentage of a country’s population living in urban areas as the explanatory 
variable.5 The World Bank publishes the data as one of the world development indicators. 
Unfortunately, there is no time series available for this variable. We used 1990 data because 
this date was well within the timeframe of awards that we captured. Hypothesis A is not 
trivial as it could be argued that more urbanized countries have more institutions interested in 
presenting awards. Whether the degree of urbanization raises or lowers the average number 
of awards in a country is therefore an empirical issue. 
Hypothesis B: The number of awards in a country increases depending on the extent of the 
market sector. 
Markets are known to be more anonymous than other allocation rules (Bowles 1998). 
Therefore, the larger the size of the market sector in a country the greater the degree of 
anonymity, hence the need for signals in the form of awards. Precise data on the size of the 
market sector were not available because it depends on the “market” definition. However, 
many countries publish the government share of GDP. Because market activities can be 
approximated as those activities not undertaken by the government, we constructed the 
                                                 
5 From a sociological perspective, anonymity is the defining criterion of a city (Porterfield 1952; Tittle and 
Stafford 1992). 
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variable size of the market sector as one minus the government share of GDP.6 The data on 
the government share of the real GDP in 1996 constant prizes was the average over the 
period from 1950 to 2000. 
We cannot take Hypothesis B as a given because there may be some doubt if awards are 
indeed used as symbols of differentiation and status in countries with a high market share. 
Traditionally, the elite of most countries consist of politicians, famous artists, and sports 
personalities—the group that represents the majority of entries in the IWW. This old elite 
tends to resort to awards to visibly attest to their importance. It is thus conceivable that a 
smaller market sector is associated with more awards. Again, empirical analysis must 
establish whether the hypothesis formulated holds. 
Openness 
 
In settings with continuous, locally based interactions by the same set of persons, individual 
characteristics are assessed over time and a reputation is built. There is less need for awards 
to signal position and status. However, to establish such knowledge is more difficult when 
there is frequent interaction with strangers; therefore, generally recognized awards are 
particularly useful as signals. 
Hypothesis C: The number of generally recognized awards increases depending on the extent 
of globalization. 
In contrast, the more globalized a country is the less important are national awards given by 
governments because they mean comparatively little in an international setting. 
Hypothesis D: The number of national state awards is smaller when the extent of 
globalization is larger. 
The degree of social globalization is empirically captured by an index constructed by Dreher 
and Schneider (2006). The index is composed of a weighted average of data on personal 
contacts (outgoing telephone traffic, financial transfers, international tourism, phone costs for 
                                                 
6 This is only a rough approximation because there is no accounting for the third sector. Data on the size of the 
third sector are only available for the restricted set of OECD countries. 
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international calls, foreign population), data on information flow (telephone mainlines, 
Internet hosts, Internet users, cable television, daily newspapers, and number of radios), and 
data on cultural proximity (number of McDonald’s restaurants). The index is available for a 
large number of countries on a yearly basis between 1970 and 2003 on a 0 to 10 scale, where 
higher values denote more globalization. We used the average value of the social 
globalization index over this time period. 
IV. Empirical Estimates 
 
For the analysis, we used the individual-level data from the IWW together with the country 
data from the different sources described above. This allowed us to use the control variables 
that were available on the individual level like age, sector of occupation, and mobility. 
It may be that the sample composition depends on some of the explanatory variables of 
interest and that the sample composition in turn has an effect on the average number of 
awards in a country. Looking at the business people on the list illustrates this. The IWW team 
automatically includes the members of the board of directors and the CEOs of the top 500 
U.S. companies and the top 500 non-U.S. companies. We would have biased estimates if (1) 
managers and board members of these companies received less or more prizes than 
individuals from other sectors, and (2) some of the variables we use to explain the number of 
awards in a country also influenced a company’s location decision. There is suggestive 
evidence that countries with global companies have a higher percentage of business people in 
the sample and that these business people, on average, have fewer awards than individuals 
from other sectors. Hence, variables that influence whether a company locates in a country 
influence the number of awards via sample composition. 
The same holds for current and former socialism as an explanatory variable. Socialist 
countries exhibit a higher share of sportsmen and musicians. These in turn seem to have more 
awards than individuals from other sectors. For the same reason, the estimate of the effect of 
political instability on the number of awards might be biased. The IWW team admits that all 
heads of governments and important ministers are on the IWW list. Hence, countries with 
frequent political changes tend to have a higher percentage of politicians in the IWW than 
more stable countries. Again, there will be a spurious correlation between instability and the 
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number of awards driven by differences in sample composition if politicians have 
systematically more or less awards than entries from other sectors. In addition, countries with 
high international profiles could have a higher than average proportion of diplomats and 
ambassadors. Ambassadors and diplomats tend to have a high number of awards due to the 
nature of their jobs. Hence, some international countries might exhibit a higher average 
number of awards due to factors that are exogenous to this analysis. To eliminate these kinds 
of biases, we controlled for sample composition in all regressions by including the sector of 
occupation for each individual. 
Further, we controlled for variables, which were unrelated to selection, but picked up 
variation in the number of awards between countries in which we were not interested. First, 
we controlled for the average age of the individuals in each country in every regression. 
Older persons tend to have more awards because they have accumulated awards over a longer 
span of time. Second, mobile persons tend to have more awards because they are exposed to 
a greater number of different award-giving institutions (e.g., different national governments). 
Hence, countries with a higher percentage of mobile persons tend to have more awards 
irrespective of the explanatory variables of interest. Mobility is controlled for by a dummy 
variable constructed based on the biography of each individual. It indicates whether a person 
has spent more than half of their career life outside the home country. Third, we also 
controlled for the long-term average of per-capita income. This controls for a variety of 
country-specific factors such as development. The long-term average is used to account for 
the fact that the individuals in the IWW accumulated their awards over an extended period. 
The explanatory variables should be representative of those that prevailed during the time 
that the awards were accumulated. The average age of the people in the sample is 68. Hence, 
the awards of the average individual in the sample were accumulated approximately over the 
span of the last 40 years. In the regressions, the mean over the years 1950 to 2004 of real 
GDP per capita (inflation adjusted by chain series from the Penn World Table) is used. 
To control for the fact that the observations within one country are dependent on another 
country, we clustered at the country level. For ease of interpretation, we present OLS results. 
However, all results are robust with respect to the usage of zero-inflated negative binomial 
models that account for the large percentage of persons with zero awards (48 percent) and the 
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count nature of the data. If anything, the coefficients get more significant. The residuals are 
approximately normally distributed, which gives us confidence in the estimation results 
obtained with OLS. 
Table 2 presents the results. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Effects of Anonymity 
 
Hypothesis A: Model 1 shows that the percentage of urban population has a statistically 
significant positive impact on the number of awards per person. An increase in the share of 
the population living in urban areas by 10 percentage points increases the average number 
of awards per person by 0.02. 
Hypothesis B: The size of the market sector has a weakly significant positive impact on the 
number of awards per person. An increase of nongovernmental activities as a percentage of 
GDP by 10 percentage points increases the number of awards per person by 0.4 (Model 2). 
The size of the effect is substantial considering that the average person in the sample has 2.7 
awards. 
Effects of Openness 
 
Hypothesis C: Model 3 of Table 2 shows that social globalization has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the average number of awards in a country. Hence, the more a 
country is exposed to foreigners, the more important are visible and communicable signals of 
success or quality, which is reflected in a higher number of awards. 
Hypothesis D: According to Model 4, social globalization has no statistically significant 
effect on the number of national state awards. Although there is a difference in the general 
number of awards received, where globalization raises this number, Hypothesis D must be 
left open; it cannot empirically be shown that national state awards lose importance in a 
globalized world. 
Page 13 
In a final regression, all of the previously discussed variables were included in a single 
regression simultaneously. Table 2, Model 6, presents the results. The qualitative results 
remain unchanged, although the significance levels improved somewhat. Hence, the effects 
of anonymity and fractionalization on the number of awards per person are robust with 
respect to the inclusion of a variety of other variables in addition to the controls and do 
indeed capture different context factors, rather than being expressions of one underlying 
factor. Awards are used when the setting is more intensive, more anonymous, and more open. 
In particular, the more urbanized a country, the larger the market sector, and the more 
exposed to globalization, the more that awards are used as signals. 
In addition, older people exhibit a statistically significantly higher number of awards per 
person, which simply reflects an accumulation effect over time. Mobility does not have an 
effect on the average number of awards per person. However, as expected, mobile people 
tend to have fewer awards from the government of their country of origin. There is no 
systematic relationship between GDP and the number of awards. 
For a given demand and supply of awards and a given perceived award quality, a higher 
profile as well as the importance of the IWW increase the benefit of stating more awards. The 
estimates are biased when the explanatory variables of interest influence the profile and the 
importance of the IWW across countries. No data on the spread and influence of the IWW is 
available across countries so that we cannot control for the variation in the degree of 
significance attributed to the IWW across countries. However, we cannot think of a variable 
that is correlated with our explanatory variables and influences the perceived importance of 
the IWW at the same time. As a rough test, we approximated this factor by controlling for 
whether the country was part of the OECD, assuming that the reference work might be 
valued higher in the respective countries. However, this variable was insignificant in all the 
regressions presented below and did not alter coefficients or significance levels in any 
meaningful way. 
Norms related to status, visible symbols of honor, and awards could influence the willingness 
of individuals to state their awards. However, these norms are largely endogenous, being 
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channels via which some of the explanatory variables of interest influence the stated number 
of awards and therefore do not need to be controlled. 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the phenomenon of awards in a cross-
country perspective. Our analysis shows that the intensity of usage and importance of awards 
follow economically predictable patterns. Awards serve as signaling devices; their 
importance increases with the degree of anonymity and the extent of globalization in a 
country. 
Although our results are consistent with the hypothesis that awards serve as signals and hence 
fulfill an important function in society in decreasing transaction costs, we leave open whether 
the current number and rate of awards is socially optimal. In particular, an analysis remains 
open on the relationship between awards and monetary compensation as alternative rewards. 
However, such an endeavor is restricted by the lack of data on awards presently available. 
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Appendix: Description of the Data Source for Awards 
 
Criteria for Admission into the International Who’s Who  
 
In general, the editorial team of the International Who’s Who uses a set of criteria for 
inclusion in the book, for example, all heads of state, all directors of international 
organizations, all principal members of the ‘cabinets’ of all countries,7 some national-level 
leaders,8 permanent representatives to the UN, key diplomats in each country, the head of 
each religion (all Cardinals, Chief Rabbis, etc.), heads of leading universities worldwide, 
chairmen, board members, CEOs and CFOs of the Global 500 (non-U.S.) and Fortune 500 
(U.S.) companies, and prize winners of distinguished awards (such as Nobel Prize, Pulitzer 
Prize, Prix Goncourt, Fields Medal, Akutagawa Prize, UNESCO International Science Prize, 
etc.). Within sports, the winners of the most important international competitions as well as 
the captains of principal sports teams are included. Within the film and television industries, 
the winners of the principal awards, festival prizes, and so on are admitted. Hence, the entries 
in the IWW do not necessarily represent the respective national elite, but a comparable 
sample of individuals in all countries. It could be considered problematic that prizes are used 
as criteria for the inclusion of individuals in some areas, such as music, sports, or film. 
However, because the criteria are the same for all countries, this should not induce any 
systematic bias between countries.9 
Coverage 
 
Some areas of the world are underrepresented in the IWW, specifically parts of Africa and 
Asia. However, due to the Internet, international coverage has been greatly enhanced in the 
last few years. Nevertheless, there are still more U.S. and western European entrants than 
entrants from other parts of the world. This may result in a skewed distribution of entries, 
which might bias our results. However, several tests confirmed that this was not the case. 
With 212 countries in the IWW, basically, all countries of the world are included. Further, 
                                                 
7 Included are the equivalent of finance minister, foreign minister, and defense ministers, and any ministers of 
particular national importance, for example, oil ministers in OPEC countries. 
8 Included are U.S. senators, Indian state chief ministers, and Chinese provincial heads. 
9 Further, the IWW team only considers major prizes such as the Oscars or Nobel prizes. Individuals included in 
the IWW due to a major prize they won still contribute to assessing country-level factors. Depending on 
perceived award quality and the importance of awards in their country, they will typically have received more or 
less prizes prior to winning the decisive award and may or may not indicate these other prizes. 
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because the set of criteria for inclusion is fixed, the types of persons in the IWW are the same 
for all countries. The greater number of entries in some countries is driven by the longer 
period of coverage, so that the admissible set of persons is represented for more years. We 
tested whether there is a systematic relationship between the percentage of the population 
represented in the IWW and the average number of awards in each country. The correlation 
between the two variables is 0.016. In a regression, the coefficient of the share of population 
represented is far from significant. Further, the coefficient has a positive sign, although it 
should have been negative in case our concern was valid. Including the variable for the share 
of the population in the IWW in any of the regressions presented below changes neither the 
coefficients nor the significance levels in any meaningful way. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Average Number of Awards per Individual per Country 
Total Awards 
Mean 2.66 
Variance  1.96 
Top 10 Countries in Each Category 
Canada 6.82 
UK 6.78 
Poland 6.16 
Australia 5.66 
Senegal 5.30 
Hungary 5.00 
New Zealand 4.96 
Switzerland 4.70 
Finland 4.64 
Spain 4.20 
Information on 5 Additional Countries 
USA 3.80 
France 3.60 
Germany 2.46 
Spain 4.20 
Italy 1.96 
Source: Own data collection based on the International Who’s Who (Neal 2006). 
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Table 2: Distribution of Awards Across Countries: Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
National 
State 
Awards 
Model 5 
 
Awards per person Coefficient 
Urbanization 0.020*    0.026** 
 (0.009)    (0.009) 
 0.039(*)   0.045** Long-term size of 
market sector?  (0.023)   (0.020) 
  0.049 Long-term social 
globalization   
1.026* 
(0.405) (0.094) 
1.077** 
(0.373) 
Academic 2.480** 2.536** 2.557** 0.121(*) 2.550** 
 (0.383) (0.380) (0.367) (0.066) (0.366) 
National 
politician 
0.475* 0.543* 0.573* -0.031 0.575* 
 (0.234) (0.231) (0.228) (0.058) (0.226) 
1.465* 1.536** 1.504** 0.185* 1.482* Ambassadors & 
diplomats (0.589) (0.573) (0.573) (0.081) (0.583) 
Cultural sector 3.947** 3.995** 4.030** 0.371** 3.986** 
 (0.471) (0.470) (0.487) (0.116) (0.471) 
In other sector? 1.904** 1.986** 2.003** 0.431** 1.993** 
 (0.371) (0.363) (0.366) (0.124) (0.370) 
Age 0.072** 0.070** 0.072** 0.014** 0.069** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
Mobility? 0.341 0.352 0.395 -0.163** 0.349 
 (0.388) (0.390) (0.393) (0.062) (0.388) 
Average GDP 3.8*10-5 7.2*10-5* -5.6*10-5 -4.9*10-6 -1.3*10-4* 
 (3.6*10-5) (3.1*10-5) (5.6*10-5) (1.5*10-5) (6.1*10-5) 
Constant -4.994** -3.323** -4.168** -0.540** -4.227** 
 (0.914) (0.944) (0.803) (0.189) (1.001) 
Observations 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
Number of 
Countries 
78 78 78 78 78 
R^2 0.092 0.092 0.096 0.045 0.101 
 
